spacecraft require reduced parameters such as power, weight, volume, and cost, while increasing performance requirements, enabling technologies have come to the forefiont. We present data and design strategies for these enabling technologies in spacecraft.
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ILLUSTRATION OF COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGIES SUCCESSFULLY UTILIZED
1. INTRODUCTION Current trends throughout NASA, military and commercial space sectors fiivor the insertion of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies for satellite applications. However, there are also unique concerns for assuring reliable performance in the presence: of ionizing particle environments which present concerns in all orbits of interest. Our paper will detail these concems from two important perspectives including premature device failure from total ionizing dose and also single particle effects radiation hardness of their designs and which can cause both permanent failure and soft spacecraft in terms of Total Ionizing Dose (TID) errors.
only. TID effects encompass those that appear from long-term absorption of radiation. Single Background Event Effects (SEE), on the other hand, are any Spacecraft and spacecraft designers are being pushed to utilize enabling or emerging commercial devices in order to meet high science data performance in increasingly smaller and lower power and cost spacecraft. Why are these technologies enabling? The benefits may include: higher gate densities, increased speedperformance, easier system development path u s i g COTS development and test equipment, and in the case of commercial devices, decreased lead times versus rad hard @€I) devices. IC manufacturers are being driven by a commercial market of which the space community is a very small portion. Because of this (and reduced DoD efforts in this area), these technologies must be evaluated to meet performance requirements of spacecraft, especially the smaller satellite programs. However, the radiation characteristics of these technologies may show a susceptibility to the space radiation environment.
DeJining the Problem
In brief, ifa designer has selected a device with some known SEE potential (based on ground test data), analysis of SEE rates for the designer's particular mission needs to be performd. However, this is not straightforward. The radiation environment must be predicted to some degree of accuracy. Then, test data must be known in detail. Questions must be then asked such as: was the device tested in the same operating mode as it will be utilized in flight, are The trapped electron population occupies regions of space known as the inner zone (extending out to about 2.4 earth radii at the equator) and the outer zone: (from about 2.8 to 12 earth radii at the equator). The levels of intensities and the actual physical boundaries are dependent on particle energy, and are affected by secular variation in tlhe magnetic field, magnetic perturbations, loceil time effects, solar cycle variations, and individual solar events.
The outer zone population is higher in intensity by about an order of magnitude than the inner zone and extends to higher energies.
The trapped protons cannoit be classified into inner and outer zone regions. For regions greater than 1 MeV, the protons occupy a volume of space that varies inversely and monotonically with the proton's energy. The approximate boundary for trapped protons with energies greater than 10 MeV is 3.8 earth radii at the equator. The trapped proton population is also affected by the secular variations in the magnetic field, magnetic perturbations, solar cycle variations, and individual solar events.
Trapped particle levels are c:alculated using the NASA AP8 and AE8 model. The models come in solar minimum and solar maximum versions, but the models are otherwise static and do not reflect the significant variations due to storms and the geomagnetic field changes. Consequently, the trapped particle fluxes from the models represent omnidirectional, integral intensities that one would expect to accumulate on an average over a six month period of time.
Cosmic Ray Protons and Heavy Ions--Galactic cosmic ray particles originate outside of the solar system. They include ions of all elements from atomic number 1 through atomic number 92. The flux levels of these particles are low but, because they include highly energetic particles
(1 Os of MeV -E -100s of GeV) of heavy elements such as iron, they produce intense ionization as they pass through matter. As with the high energy trapped protons, they are difficult to shield against. Therefore, in spite of their low numbers, they constitute a significant hazard to electronics in terms of SEES.
As with the trapped proton population, the galactic cosmic ray particle population varies with the solar cycle. It is at its peak level during solar minimum and at its lowest level during solar maximum. The earth's magnetic field provides spacecraft with varying degrees of protection from the cosmic rays, depending primarily on the inclination and secondarily on the altitude of the trajectory. The levels of galactic cosmic ray particles also vary with the ionization state of the particle. Several models of the cosmic ray and solar flare particle environments are available. Table 1 summarizes the most commonly used and most recent one.
Mission-Dependent Environment-There are extremely large variations in the TID and SEE inducing flux levels that a given spacecraft encounters, depending on its trajectory through the radiation sources.
Low Earth Orbits (LEOS)-Satellites in LEOS pass through the particles trapped in the Van Allen belts several times each day. The level of fluxes seen during these passes varies greatly with orbit inclination and altitude. The location of the peak fluxes depends on the energy of the particle. For protons with E 10 MeV, the peak is at about 3000 km. For normal geomagnetic and solar activity conditions, the flux levels drop rapidly at altitudes over 3000 km. However, high energy protons have been detected in the regions above 3000 km after large geomagnetic storms and solar flare events.
The amount of protection that the geomagnetic field provides a satellite from the cosmic ray and solar flare particles is also dependent on the inclination and to a smaller degree the altitude of the orbit. As altitude increases, the exposure to cosmic ray and solar flare particles gradually increase. However, the effect that the inclination has on the exposure to these particles is much more important. As the inclination increases, the satellite spends more and more of its time in regions accessible to these particles, until in polar regions, it is beyond the However, because of their high altitude, they also have long exposures to the cosmic ray and solar flare environments regardless of their inclination. The levels of trapped proton fluxes that HEOs encounter depend on the perigee position of the orbit including altitude, latitude, and longitude. If this position drifts during the course of the mission, the degree of drift must be taken into account when predicting proton flux levels. HEOs also accumulate high TID levels due to both the trapped protan exposure and the electrons in the outer belts where the spacecraft spends a significant amount of time during each apogee pass.
Geostatiomzy Ovbits (GE0s)-At geostationary altitudes, the only trapped protons that are present are below energy levels necessary to initiate the nuclear events in materials surrounding the sensitive region of the device that cause SEEs. However, GEOs are almost l l l y exposed to the galactic cosmic ray and solar flare particles. Protons below about 40-50 MeV are normally geomagnetically attenuated, but this attenuation breaks down during solar flare events and geomagnetic storms. Field lines that are at about 7 earth radii during normal conditions can be compressed down to about 4 earth radii during these events. As a result, particles that were previously deflected have access to much lower latitudes and altitudes. Also, GEO satellites are continuously exposed to trapped electrons, hence, the TID accumulated in GEO orbits can be severe for locations on the satellite with little shielding.
Planetmy and Interplanet/ay--The evaluation of the radiation environment for these missions can be extremely complex depending on the number of times the trajectory passes through the earth's radiation belts, how close the spacecraft passes to the sun, and how well known the radiation environment of the planet is. Each of these factors must be taken very carehlly into account for the exact mission trajectory.
Carefbl analysis is especially important for missions that fly during solar maximum and that have trajectories that fly close to the sun. Guidelines for scaling the intensities of particles of solar origin for spacecraft outside of 1 AU have been determined by a panel of experts' . They recommend that a factor of 1 AU x 1/? be used for distances less than 1 AU and that values of 1 AU x l/? be used for distances greater than 1 AU.
Experience has shown that the most effective means of reducing uncertainty factors and design margins in particle predictions is to define for the 1.
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when the mission will fly, where the mission will fly, when the systems will be deployed, what systems must operate during worst case environment conditions, what systems are critical to mission success, the amount of shielding surrounding the SEE sensitive part(s).
Estimates that include only worst case conditions lead to overdesign and should be used only in the concept design phase of a mission when the actual launch date and length have not been defined. After the launch date and duration are defined, it is possible to estimate how long the spacecraft will be in each phase of the solar cycle. These estimates should consider the impact of a launch delay of one year. Mission scenario definition is especially important for solar flare particles where the number of events is highly dependent on the amount time that the satellite spends in solar maximum conditions. During a traditional or destructive SEL, the device current exceeds the maximum specified for the device. Unless power is removed, the device will eventually be destroyed. A Microlatch is a type of SEL where the device current is elevated, but below the device's specified maximum. Again, a power reset is required to recover normal device operation. Single Event Burnout (SEB) is a highdy localized &s&uctive burnout of the: drain-source in power MOSFETs. Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) is the &structive burnout of a gate insulator in a power MOSFET.
BASIC RADIATION EFFECTS
The SEE sensitivity of a device is discussed in terms of LET and Cross Section (a). LET is a measure of the energy deposited per unit length as an ionizing particle travels through a material. The common Unit is MeV*cm2/mg of material (Si for MOS devices). LET thneshold (LETd is the minimum LET to cause an effect, at a given particle fluence of 1E6 or 1E7 ions/cm2. U reflects the device area which is sensitive to ionizing radiation. For a specific LET, cross section is calculated: (J = %nrors/particle fluence. The units for cross section are cm2 per device or per bit. Sensitive volume refers to the device volume affected by SEE-inducing radiation. The sensitive volume is, in general, much smaller than the actual device volume.
SATELLITE SYSTEM LEVEL CONCERNS
Device parametric and permanent fbnctional failure are the principal failure modes associated with the TID environment. Since TID is a cumulative effect, total dose tolerances of devices are MTTF numbers, where the time-to-failure is the amount of mission time until the device has encountered enough dose to cause failure. As discussed earlier, the mission orbit, launch date, and launch length determine the external radiation environment. The device exposure to this hazard is determined by the amount of shielding between the device and the external environment. Requirements and design considerations are therefore based on device location on the spacecrafi. Effective mitigation tools include device TID hardness, spot-shielding of devices, box shielding, arid placing electronic boxes inside the spacecraft and/or closer together. Redundancy with powered-on devices is not effective as mitigation, since these devices will also degrade.
The system-level impact of SEE depends on the type and location of the effect, as well as on the design. Permanent device failure is, of course, of great concern. The effects of propagation of transient SEEs through a circuit, subsystem, and system are also often of particular importance. For example, a device error or failure may have effects propagating to critical mission elements, such as a command error affecting thruster firing. There are also cases where SEEs may have little or no observable effect on a system level. In fact, in most designs, there are specific areas in which SEUs have less system impact from certain radiation effects. As stated previously, a data storage recorder utilizing EDAC would fit this category. The more critical an SEE is to operational performance, the more strict the requirements should be. Since SEE presents a fhctional impact to a device, functional analysis enables evaluation of severity. The design is viewed in terms of function, not by box or physical subsystem. Functions are categorized into defined "criticality classes", or categories of differing severity of SEE occurrence. For example, for a project, there might be three criticality groups for SEU: error-functional, error-vulnerable, and error-critical. Functions in the error-functional groups are unaffected by SEUs, whether it be due to an implemented error-correction scheme or redundancy. Functions in the error-vulnerable group might be those that the risk of a low probability is assumable. Functions in the error-critical group are functions where SEE is unacceptable.
Both the functional impact of an SEE to the system or spacecraft and the probability of its occurrence provide the foundation. for setting a design requirement. Unlike TID tolerances, SEE rates are probabilistic, given as a predicted span of time within which a SEE will randomly occur.
Requirements are specified for each hnctional group by speciflmg the maximum probability of SEE permitted in each category. Optimizing design for SEE tolerance is a trade study in risk, cost, performance, and design complexity. S ystem-level SEE requirements may be hlfilled through a variety of mitigation techniques, including hardware, software, and device tolerance requirements. The most cost efficient approach may be an appropriate combination of SEE-hard devices and other mitigation. However, the availability, power, volume, and performance of radiation-hardened devices may prohibit their use. Hardware or software design also serve as effective mitigation, but design complexity may present a problem.
A combination of the two may be the selected option. It is important to note that, in general, shielding is not an effective mitigation tool for SEE, unless a device is soft to attenuable protons.
TID LESSONS: DEVICE SCREENING AND
MITIGATION
Setting llD Requirements
The prediction of the mission-specific radiation environment in the initial design phase is one of the most important tasks in the radiation effects analysis. Mssion-specific TID in the early design phase is calculated using an ideal geometry, such as a solid aluminum sphere. The ideal geometry approximates the total shielding thickness between the space environment and the point of exposure. This TID prediction is used to define spacecraft-level TID requirements for early design efforts and serve as the starting point for TID-tolerant design.
It has been observed that TID can vary by one and as much as two orders of magnitude depending on the location in the spacecraft. Therefore, using ideal geometries to provide spacecraft-level requirements can set TID requirements unnecessarily high for some components.
The spacecraft, instrument, electronic boxes, and any other material substance can all contribute to shielding. Representing these structures in a three-dimensional radiation model provides the means of calculating TIDs via 3-D ray trace methods at the component level or electronic box level. For critical missions or missions with high radiation environments, it is recommended to schedule a 3-D ray trace prediction close to the beginning of the preliminary design phase, when the spacecraft geometry is reasonably well defined and the boxes are arranged into the structure. With this method, component level levels without impacting the weight budget. Electronic boxes placed inside a spacecraft structure receive more radiation shielding from the spacecraft than those on the outside of the structure, In addition, electronic boxes placed closer together provide more shielding to each other than boxes fbrther apart. Internal box structures and components also provide shielding. Designing the softest, or less radiation tolerant devices into the center of the box, with the more radiation tolerant devices on the outer regions provides still more potential shielding to the least tolerant devices.
Veri$cation of System Hardhess and Parts Testing
Meeting iTD Requirements TID requirements are met through many avenues. Electronic devices may be procured to a hardness level sufficient to meet the box requirement. Some device packaging techniques are designed to increase radiation tolerance. However, these devices are typically costly and have long lead times for procurement. Shielding is an effective TID mitigation tool but can be costly in terms of the added weight to the spacecraft. At a device level, spot shielding offers the least impact on the weight budget. However, for electronic boxes in which large amounts of circuitry must be protected, box-level shielding may be the only practical method of reducing dose through shielding.
Slight redesign at the spacecraft and/or subsystem level can also reduce TID exposure initial parts lists serves as the initial parts database. For projects utilizing design heritage, these heritage design device lists are usually the starting point. The parts list provides for communication between engineers and radiation experts. In addition, the lists should be separate for each box to facilitate 1,ater verification with TID box level requirements if necessary.
The parts list is then lIscrubbedl' for TID tolerance by appropriate experts. This parts list scrubbing compares TIDl requirements with known tolerances of the: candidate devices. Recommendations for design come out of this review and may be in the form of device acceptance, device rejection, better device altematives, design mitigation, etc. If shielding is added, its effectiveness can be verified by adding the shielding to the 3-D model and recalculating the TID. These recommendations are device specific line items and are fed baick to the designers. These input provide design engineers with radiation information and recommendations for implementing or modifjrlng heritage designs. With this valuable input being considered during early stages of design when device selection and box design first begin, heritage use is maximized and identified radiation issues are addressed early on. At periodic intervals in desigq modified parts lists are obtained and reviewed for radiation tolerance.
LET, < 10
Devices with unknown radiation tolerance characteristics should be replaced by alternates with known tolerance to the part requirement or else tested to qualify them for radiation. Radiation testing of key devices with unknown tolerance during design reduces the risk of schedule and cost impacts of redesign and/or work-arounds. Although device TlD tolerance may vary by a factor of two or more from lot to lot, look ahead testing of devices gives insights into their use. In later development phases, testing of the flight lot parts is critical for commercial grade devices to account for the lot to lot variations that may occur as a result of manufacturers' changes in processing.
Cosmic Ray, Trapped Protons, Solar Flare
. SEE LESSONS Requirements
Flight hardware, in order to be acceptable from an SEE standpoint, must pass several requirements. First and foremost, no SEE may cause permanent damage to a system or subsystem. SEL-immune components, defined as a device having an LET, > 100 MeV*cm2/mg, should therefore be used. For any device that is not immune to SET, or other potentially destructive conditions, protective circuitry must be added to eliminate the possibility of damage, and verified by analysis or test.
Wherever practical, procure SEU h"mne devices. In devices which are not SEU-immune, the improper operation caused by an SEU must be reduced to acceptable levels, and may not cause performance anomalies or outages which require ground intervention to correct. Additionally, analysis for SEU rates and effects must take place based on the experimentally determined LET, and U of the candidate; if such device test data does not exist, ground testing is required. Error rate predictions are calculated using mission-spec@ cosmic ray induced LET spectrum, trapped proton environment spectrum, and solar flare environment spectrum, as seen in Table 2 . Systems engineering analysis of circuit design, operating modes, duty cycle, device criticality, etc ... shall be used to determine acceptable error levels for that device. Means of gaining acceptable levels include parts selection, error detection and correction schemes, redundancy and voting methods, error tolerant coding, or the acceptance of errors in non-critical areas. While testing for heavy ion induced events, the error measurement determines the upset crosssection. The measurement is repeated with various particle types and energies which vary in ionization strength, as measured by the particle's LET. The results of a series of such tests are customarily presented in a plot showing the cross-section versus the particle LET. For a given part type, a family of such curves may be measured to quanti@ the part's upset sensitivity under various operating conditions including static versus dynamic operation, operating voltage, read versus write mode, etc., as appropriate for the planned application. Proton upset measurements follow a similar treatment, though the cross-section dependence is then on the proton energy instead of the LET.
SEU Rate Predictions and Impact Analysis
The bases for the SEU upset rate predictions for on orbit applications are gained through heavy ion and proton testing under laboratory conditions, as described above, to determine a device's upset sensitivity.
Once the sensitivity to the relevant range of particles is known, the next step in calculating the expected upset rate on orbit involves determination of the expected particle environment and its dependencies on orbital position, solar cycle, solar weather conditions, and other variables. For a given orbit of interest, these models are exercised to evaluate the fluxes of protons and heavy ions at the location of the device of interest in the satellite. These calculations account for tlhe satellite shielding effects, and the result is an environment assessment indicating the energy distribution and numbers of protons and heiavy ions reaching the device. In the case of cosmic rays, the heavy ion particle environment may be combined with estimates of the geometq ofthe sensitive node in the microcircuit to evaluate the rate of depositing charge packets exceeding the minimum amount required to alter the state of the circuit. The environment estimates from these models are combined mathematically with the circuit sensitivity measurements described in the preceding paragraph to calculate expected upset rates from the proton and heavy ion environments respectively, and the two results are combined to arrive at an aggregate upset rate. A similar approach is applied to assess upset rates due to solar flare protons.
The impact of a given upset rate is a very application dependent issue. As described above, analysis begins with top down impact assessments in the conceptual design phase of the mission, resulting in criticality levels for the respective hardware subsystlems along fbnctional boundaries. This process is known as Single Event Effect Criticality hidysis (SEECA), and its successfbl implementation begins in mission planning and continues as; a key design tool through the subsystem design phase.
SEUMitigation
Digital and analog devices, like SEES, may be divided into two overlapping categories: memory or data-related devices such as RAMS or ICs used in communication links or data streams, and control-related devices such as microprocessors, logic ICs, and power controllers.
Mitigation of Memories and Data-Related Devices-There are several options for datarelated SEU mitigation. First, parity checking is a "detect only'' scheme, which counts the number of logic one states occurring in a data set, producing a single parity bit saying whether an odd or even number of ones were in that structure.
[2]. This scheme will flag an SEU if an odd number of bits are in error, but not if an even number of bits are in error.
A second option, Hamming code, is known as single bit correct, double bit detect. The use of EDAC schemes such as this, known as scrubbing, is common among current solid-state recorders flying in space [for example, 3,4]. Hamming code schemes encode an entire block of data with a check code; this method will detect the position of a single error, and the existence of more than one error in a data structure [2]. Because the SEU position is known, it is possible to correct this error. This coding method is recommended for systems with low probabilities of multiple errors in a single data structure (e.g., only a single bit in error in a byte of data).
Other block error codes provide more powedd error correcting codes (ECCs). Among these, Reed-Solomon ( R -S ) coding is becoming widespread in its usage [5] . The R-S code is able to detect and correct multiple and consecutive errors in a data structure. Mitigation may also be performed at the system level. Typical error detection schemes as described above may be used, and error correction may be accomplished by rewriting or retransmitting data. A combination of EDAC techniques may be most effective.
The above methods provide ways of reducing the effective bit error rate @ER) of data storage areas such as solid-state recorders and communication paths or data interconnects. Table 3 summarizes sample EDAC methods for memory or data devices and systems. The SEDS system detects the number of retransmissions (or retries) that occur following an SEU on the 1773 bus. Ground test data [18, 17] has shown that all SEUs observed by the system are in the form of non-valid Manchester errors causing a bus retry. For SAMPEX, a single retry is enabled. This is all that has been necessary. Calculations by LaBel, et a1 ... [17] have shown that the probability of a failure of a retried message is extremelly small. Indeed, all bus retries have been suuccesshl. Thus, the effective bit error rate (BER.) is zero.
8.
CONCLUSIONS system utilizes among its error control features detection of a non-valid Manchester encoding of data. As stated above, parity is a "detect only"
The second method is in the proper format. Ground testing has shown that Manchester-encoding errors are the prime standard has a system level protocol option of 
